

Testimony Before the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics (NCVHS) Subcommittee on Privacy, Confidentiality and Security

Addressing Healthcare Security Challenges

July 14, 2021

[Oral testimony 15 minutes during 10-11:30 panel]

My name is Erik Decker, and I am the Chief Information Security Officer for Intermountain Healthcare. Intermountain Healthcare is a nonprofit system of 25 hospitals, 225 clinics, a Medical Group with 2,600 employed physicians and advanced practice clinicians, a health insurance company called SelectHealth, and other health services in Utah, Idaho, and Nevada. Intermountain is widely recognized as a leader in transforming healthcare by using evidence-based best practices to consistently deliver high-quality outcomes and sustainable costs. I am here today presenting on behalf of the Health Sector Coordinating Council (HSCC), where I serve as an elected member of the Executive Committee.

On behalf of the Health Sector Coordinating Council (HSCC), I thank the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics' (NCVHS) Subcommittee on Privacy, Confidentiality and Security for inviting our input on improving the security posture of the healthcare industry and the challenges confronting our sector.

The healthcare sector is one of sixteen critical sectors identified by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The HSCC is a private sector-led critical infrastructure advisory council organized under PPD-21¹, representing large, medium and small health industry stakeholders working with government partners to identify and mitigate threats and vulnerabilities affecting the ability of the sector to deliver healthcare services to our nation's citizens.

In summary, we have identified the following key areas of focus, which are described in greater detail below:

1. **Understanding the New Threat Landscape:** Threat actors continue to grow in sophistication while healthcare organizations struggle to maintain defenses
2. **Continued Incentivization:** Continue to innovate and support the nearly 1 million healthcare organizations to build cyber defenses
3. **Sector Response:** The healthcare sector has organized a strong response to these cyber threats
4. **Additional Policy Recommendations:** Additional measures to consider that can assist the healthcare sector

I. Understanding the New Threat Landscape

Historically the focus of threat actors has been related to theft and sale of sensitive data. As our sector has evolved to protect against these data concerns the threat actors have evolved as well. As noted by the HC3, in 2021 alone there have been a total of 48 ransom attacks against our sector². Additionally,

¹ [Presidential Policy Directive -- Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience | whitehouse.gov \(archives.gov\)](https://www.whitehouse.gov/archives/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience)

² Ransomware Trends 2021

within the last year alone we are now seeing 72% of these ransom incidents including data leakage. Another study found a 55% jump in cyber incidents against our sector for 2020.³ According to a joint bulletin authored by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services (HHS), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) last October, there was credible information of increased and imminent Ryuk ransomware threats to our sector. This was quickly followed by the SolarWinds Orion network management threat announced by CISA and then another related to Microsoft Exchange Servers. Just this last 4th of July a new supply chain attack, impacting the IT management software called Kaseya, has been reported to have caused impact to upwards of 1,500 businesses in one day⁴. If these attacks had occurred at the beginning of the pandemic, when the healthcare sector was reconfiguring its operations to support a response to the spread of the COVID19 infection, it could have caused catastrophic impacts on public health. This demonstrates threat actors continue to adjust and evolve to cause maximum impact to their victims.

The last several years have taught us that the threat actors will continue to innovate new ways they can cause damage and extort our sector. As we consider new innovative ways to protect our sector we must also consider how the threat actors will change in tactics, as they have in the past. Today we deal with issues of data theft, extortion and impacts to patient care due to our Health IT systems being unavailable. We must consider the ability of a threat actor to hold the integrity of our data for ransom as well. For example, it has been demonstrated through security research that malware can manipulate and inject realistic images of cancerous growth into MRI scans⁵. When radiologists looked at these images, 99% of them believed the scan had detected cancer. This kind of attack brings the “Deep Fake” to healthcare. A future attack could extort our ability to trust the very data that we use to treat and care for patients.

Cybersecurity incidents are not only a threat to national security, they are also a threat to patient safety, as attacks can cause denial of service, medical device corruption, and data manipulation that directly impacts clinical operations, patient care and public health. In addition, healthcare data and information remain lucrative targets for theft and exploitation, particularly through ransomware attacks and COVID-themed social engineering by criminal groups and adversarial nation states.⁶ A series of recent bulletins testifies to these threats.⁷

II. Continued Incentivization

We are very pleased that Congress signed into law this past January, H.R. 7898⁸ (now P.L. 116-321), which recognizes increasing and dire cyber threats against the health system, and that our regulatory structure under the Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act (HIPAA) has skewed too heavily toward penalizing even the best prepared and well-resourced healthcare organizations victimized by cyber-attacks. The new law rebalances this inequity by directing HHS, when making determinations

³ Healthcare Cyber Attacks Rise by 55%, Over 26 Million in the U.S. Impacted - CPO Magazine

⁴ Up to 1,500 businesses could be affected by a cyberattack carried out by a Russian group. - The New York Times (nytimes.com)

⁵ Malware in CT/MRI machines can inject fake cancerous growths. (foglets.com)

⁶ [PowerPoint Presentation \(hhs.gov\)](https://www.hhs.gov/powerpoint-presentation)

⁷ [NCSC China Genomics Fact Sheet 2021.pdf \(dni.gov\)](https://www.dni.gov/ncsc-china-genomics-fact-sheet-2021.pdf), [20201222-001 FBI PIN.pdf \(govdelivery.com\)](https://www.fbi.gov/pin/20201222-001)

⁸ PUBL321.PS (congress.gov)

against HIPAA-covered entities and their business associates victimized by a cyberattack, to take into account the covered entity's use of recognized security best practices during the past twelve months. More importantly, this provision serves as a positive incentive for health providers to increase investment in cybersecurity for the benefit of regulatory compliance and, ultimately, patient safety.

Among the cybersecurity best practices recognized by this law are those established under Section 405(d) of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015. Section 405(d) was implemented as a joint standing task group of the HSCC Cybersecurity Working Group and HHS, composed of more than 250 volunteers from across the HSCC membership and HHS, of which I am the industry co-lead. The result, two years in the making, was a publication called "[Healthcare Industry Cybersecurity Practices \(HICP\)](#)", which provides scalable and voluntary cybersecurity principles and practices for use by providers of any size and ability. This publication is designed to be used across the sector, tailored to small, medium, and large sized organizations.

We are grateful for the support this new law will provide, but we are concerned that HHS has chosen to publish a request for information prior to the publication of a proposed rule. Adding an RFI to the comment process will inevitably slow the process and add another layer of bureaucracy that we cannot afford while cyber threats continue to advance, and healthcare providers try and keep up. As we know from the past year, many cyber-attacks have been successful and have brought some providers to their knees by forcing them to divert patients to other care settings and dropping down to paper records. These scenarios place patient lives in the balance and drive up the cost of care for the entire sector.

Per the U.S. Census Bureau, there are "907,426 businesses in the Health Care and Social Assistance sector⁹." Yet the majority of these businesses operate on very thin margins and consider cybersecurity to be non-revenue generating overhead costs. This means, practically, that the majority of these organizations underinvest in cybersecurity protections or rely on their IT department to absorb its obligations. Knowing that cyber safety is patient safety, this business paradigm needs assistance. Given that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is the largest payer in the United States, I propose reimbursement models designed to directly fund cybersecurity programs be investigated. This revenue would help set a minimum floor of protection which is crucial for the public health and well-being as we embark in the digital age.

HSCC recommends NCVHS:

1. Advocate for the 405(d) HICP and other HSCC best practices which are freely available tools that can be used by the sector to strengthen individual and our collective cyber posture;
2. Request HHS move directly to proposed rulemaking for implementation of P.L 116-321 (HR 7898); and
3. Push for policies that incentivize, or reimburse, for healthcare providers who practice better cyber hygiene rather than punitive approaches that penalize them.

III. How Our Sector is Addressing Threats

A major component of the HSCC is its Cybersecurity Working Group, which represents more than 300 healthcare organizations, with over 600 members, in direct patient care, medical materials, health

⁹ Health Care Still Largest U.S. Employer (census.gov)

information technology, health plans and payers, laboratories, biologics and pharmaceuticals, and public health. In the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, Section 405(c) directed the establishment of the Health Care Industry Cybersecurity (HCIC) Task Force. This HCIC Task Force produced a publication that outlined six imperatives and over 100 action items to combat this threat.

The HSCC Cybersecurity Working Group has organized around this HCIC Task Force Report and works in partnership with HHS to implement new publications and materials. The HSCC has made tangible progress toward recognizing and addressing numerous weaknesses in the cybersecurity of our systems, operations and supply chain, particularly through the formation of 15 Task Groups and creation of 11 industry-developed [best practices and guidance](#) developed (some jointly with HHS and FDA) over the past three years. These include resources on: medical device product security and management; cybersecurity practices for health delivery organizations based on the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (a mandate of §405(d) of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015); methods for tactically managing a cyber crisis; cybersecurity management of healthcare supply chains; telehealth cybersecurity; and protection of innovation capital such as vaccine research against cyber theft.

We encourage the continued partnership with our Sector Risk Management Agency (SRMA), HHS, as well as other key agencies within the federal government, such as CISA, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and law enforcement agencies such as the FBI.

IV. Additional Policy and Regulatory Imperatives

In addition to the HHS 405(d) Task Group's HICP best practices referenced above, there are several other areas which have the potential to help advance our sector's cyber posture if they can be adequately supported. We have described these below.

- **National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA):** Section 9002 of the Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act changes the name of "Sector-specific Agency" as detailed in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, to "Sector Risk Management Agency" (SRMA). HHS is the SRMA for the Healthcare and Public Health Sector. Yet, HHS does not receive any direct funding to accomplish the responsibilities laid out in Section 9002 which includes, among many other things: reviewing the current framework for securing critical infrastructure, including: overseeing and regularly updating a cybersecurity risk framework for the sector; providing specialized sector-specific expertise to critical infrastructure owners and operators; supporting the sector overall through threat information sharing; and facilitating the identification of intelligence needs and priorities of critical infrastructure owners and operators.
- **Information Sharing:** The Cybersecurity Act of 2015 permits protected sharing of highly sensitive cybersecurity threat information specifically with CISA. This sharing provides liability protections from regulatory enforcement. Unfortunately, in the midst of a cybersecurity attack, most healthcare organizations will work directly with the respective law enforcement agency, such as the FBI or Secret Service, and limit further sharing due to concerns of incident leakage and misinformation. CISA has asked for more intelligence sharing from across the industry, yet in the midst of a crisis it's difficult to engage with all agencies in the manner they desire. It is recommended that the law enforcement agency serve as the funnel to CISA, sharing the threat intelligence information directly with CISA, in as near-real time as possible, so the government can help protect other critical infrastructure. Additionally, during a crisis, an organization quite often needs to have access to sensitive threat intelligence managed by law enforcement.

Unfortunately, law enforcement tends to be hesitant to share this information for fear of impacting their investigations. That same information is needed by the healthcare organization to assess its impacts and protect patient safety. Lastly, there continues to be ongoing misunderstanding among some providers around when threat sharing is allowed.

We recommend undertaking an initiative that; a) allows for improved bi-directional information sharing between healthcare and law enforcement; b) aggregates information sharing from law enforcement back into all the critical infrastructure Information Sharing Analysis Centers (ISACs); c) provide further education to critical infrastructure around the legal protections for sharing this sensitive information with the federal government; and d) more education on when threat sharing is permissible.

- **100-Day Plan** – Similar to the effort President Biden initiated¹⁰ for the nation’s electric power system against cyber-attacks, that involved a 100-day plan executed jointly by the U.S. Department of Energy, CISA, and the energy sector, we believe a like-minded effort aimed at the health sector would be highly beneficial. It would strengthen collaboration and resolve across the sector, especially in light of the pandemic we continue to fight. The energy plan involves soliciting feedback from their sector on how best to inform future recommendations for supply chain security in U.S. energy systems.
- **Support for HSCC** – Presently, our sector is run almost exclusively on volunteer donations. The two HSCC employees are funded by H-ISAC and all but one of our sector’s workgroups are comprised largely by industry volunteers and some federal staff. Presently, the only workstream that has any HHS fulltime and contractor support is for the 405(d) HICP effort described above. The dedicated resources within HHS today support one Task Group, whereas the other 14 Task Groups are managed without dedicated support. The 405(d) workgroup, which produced HICP, is a shining example of what is possible with public-private collaboration. We recommend expanding the support outlined within the 405(d) program to the larger HSCC Cybersecurity Working Group.
- **Support for the SRMA** - As mentioned previously, the SRMA for the Health Sector is HHS. Within HHS, there are limited resources allocated to help coordinate between the various operation divisions (such as HC3, FDA, ONC, ASPR, OCIO) and ultimately with the sector. The result is most healthcare organizations are unaware of how to engage with HHS on these cyber related issues. We recommend providing further funding to ASPR, the HHS Operating Division tasked with engaging with the sector, to better coordinate and expand on the public-private partnership.

I appreciate the opportunity to present my perspective before this distinguished committee.

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HHS 405(d) Industry Lead

¹⁰ [Biden Administration Takes Bold Action to Protect Electricity Operations from Increasing Cyber Threats | Department of Energy](#)